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ABSTRACT 
The concept of corporate governance is an abstractive one. There are great 
differences of the scope of corporate governance among different countries, varied by 
the market philosophy and the value towards corporate control which one country 
holds. In the context of Hong Kong, there are some interesting mixes between the 
market system and the ways of corporate control. On the one hand, the Hong Kong 
market is characterised by Chinese family run businesses which there is no clear 
separation of ownership from management, and the market has always been 
championed on the laissez faire approach towards commercial activities; on the other 
hand, as Hong Kong is a common law jurisdiction country, the concept of corporate 
control (which occupies largely on the regime of corporate governance) still evolves 
from the traditional, nineteenth century joint stock company format, and the 
combination of the two seems to have worked quite happily as the growth of 
companies in Hong Kong has been in a lightning speed in the past few decades. 
With the growing intricacy in the securities market, the traditional concept 
towards capital flotation of companies in the public seems to be too simple to keep 
hold of fraud and misfeasance, and there are questions of growing concern over public 
interest and corporate control. Corporate governance as a result now constitutes a 
major overhaul to the idea of corporate control. 
In this paper it is intended to give an overview of the framework of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong using the conformance approach. The major legislation 
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which have a relevance to the topic will be depicted and, through the description ofthe 
legislation and other codes of practices and conducts, the defective areas of the law in 
this aspect will be discussed. 
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1.0 Corporate Governance and Securities Market 
The issue of ‘corporate governance，has become topical in recent years. On 
the one hand, as international stock market has become more competitive, there have 
been suggestions that the answer to attract investors, especially those international 
ones, is not only to review the general business environment, but also to look into the 
basic component of the stock market - the company itself. It is suggested that the 
performance of a company will be directly affected by the effectiveness of the board, 
and hence a good 'corporate governance，could eventually build up an effective and 
responsible board, and in the long run a good performance of company will fulfil the 
goal of growth and also restore investors' confidence and their cash to invest in. More 
importantly, however, in recent years, there are a number of corporate collapses in 
different countries. The scandals of the Maxwell and BCCI case in the UK point 
directly to the problem of commercial fraud; and the heavy financial losses of Credit 
Lyonnais in France and Barings futures trading scandal in Singapore (even more 
recently, the scandal ofDaiwa Bank group in Japan) point directly to the basic problem 
of director's duties - duty of due care and skill, and fiduciary duty to the company and 
to shareholders as member of the company. All these corporate collapses suggest a 
review of whether regulatory control over corporations is enough, and such 
suggestions reinforce a belief that a well-defined corporate governance could be the 
panacea to keep the companies alive and grow, and thereby keep the whole securities 
market intact and provide the necessary environment for investors to further invest 
their money into the market. 
In Hong Kong the issue of corporate governance has gradually gathered momentum in 
the past few years. The backdrop has been set with the corporate collapses such as 
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Carrian and a number ofbank failures in the 1980s, and the October 1987 crash ofthe 
stock market triggered off with a number of legislative moves towards a re-
organisation of the whole stock market and regulatory bodies, and together with it a 
tightened control over the whole securities market. The issue of corporate 
governance, however, only came to forefront again when in May 1995 it was disclosed 
to the public that public-listed company directors knowingly or intentionally hid their 
criminal records and earned reprimands from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
These disclosures arouse the doubts again over company director's duties to 
shareholders and whether shareholder's interests, especially those of the minority ones, 
are adequately protected by legislation. Again, there are suggestions and comments 
from the general public that something more should be done to improve the state of 
corporate governance in Hong Kong. 
As corporate governance is a wide-ranging topic and it encompasses social, 
economic, and legal aspects to tackle the issue, and the topic now even extends itself 
to touch upon any type of companies and even on the business activities and functions 
which the company involves, it is difficult when different countries or places possess 
different social, political, economic, and cultural traits, which in effect influence the 
whole system and value towards corporate control. In this paper, it is intended to 
delineate the conformance device of corporate governance in Hong Kong. By 
reviewing the scope of regulatory control system in Hong Kong, it will discuss the 
adequacy of it and also the necessity (or not) to extend further control over those 
deficient areas. 
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2.0 The Framework of Corporate Governance - Conformance 
2.1 Corporate Governance Defined 
The word 'governance ‘ gained currency in the UK in the seventies when 
Harold Wilson published his book entitled “ The Governance of Britain (1977)". 
Loosely speaking, ‘corporate governance ‘ can be interpreted as the ways how 
corporations be governed, or controlled. 
In the Cadbury Report, corporate governance has been defined as ‘ the system 
hy which companies are directed and controlled. ‘ More importantly, Professor 
Tricker viewed corporate governance as the subject which ‘addresses issues facing 
hoard of directors, such as the interaction with top management and relationships 
with the owners others interested in the affairs of the company, including creditors, 
debt financiers, analysts, auditors and corporate regulators.^' 
There are, however, other academics who look at the subject from the 
regulatory angle and define corporate governance as a cluster of responsibilities:-
'Governance ‘ is concerned largely, though... not exclusively, with relating 
the corporation to the institutional environment within which it functions. 
Issues of governance include the legitimacy of corporate power, corporate 
accountability, to whom and for what the corporations is responsible, and by 
what standards it shall he governed and by whom '^ 
^Robert I. Tricker，International Corporate Governance, Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1995, foreword. 
2j. Worthy and R. Neuschel，Emerging Issues in Corporate Governance, Chicago: Northwestern 
University Press, 1983, p.4. 
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The notion of corporate governance therefore clusters around how it reflects 
changes in expectations for the role that corporations play, or ought to play, in modern 
society. The focus on corporate governance，as viewed from the above definition, 
place emphasis on both process and structure of control and on how to develop the 
basic philosophies or principles from which a set of or a code of best behaviour can be 
develop inside the corporations. 
2.2 Corporate Governance as related to Public-Listed Companies 
Viewed from the definition of corporate governance as a cluster of 
responsibilities, the subject as related to public listed companies will be of relevance to 
the regulatory environment under which the companies operate. The importance of 
the legal institution therefore lies at the conformance aspect - the drafting, enactment, 
and enforcement of legislation - upon which the extent of the legitimacy of corporate 
power and corporate accountability are based (i.e. to settle the to whom'aand 'for 
what’ question), and as well to foster the standard ofbehaviour through codification of 
standardised rules (though not legally binding in a strict legal sense) and eventually 
internalised in the corporation. 
To apply such approach to the public-listed companies whereby the general 
public could be as well become the stakeholders, the basis of corporate governance as 
viewed from the conformance approach is 'accountability'. By means of compliance 
with laws and regulations and the existence of reliable financial information and 
reporting which include the protection of records against the concealing of theft and 
the distortion of results, it imposes a test as on how far such aberrations can be 
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discouraged and how quickly they can be brought to light through properly constituted 
board of directors and audit committees, vigilantly observed by responsible 
shareholders, and supported by full and timely disclosure of information providing by 
effective reporting and auditing systems. In fact, these are also the stated principles on 
which the recommended Code of Best Practice as contained in the Cadhury Report is 
based. The whole control system under these principles can be represented as in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Corporate Governance - Conformance 
/ EXTERNAL REGULATORY SYSTEM \ / EVTERNALREGULATORYSYSTEM \ 
/ SHAREHOLDERS \ / BOARD OF DHlECTORS \ 
FE^ANCD\L REPORTTmG GOUNCE. L J NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
ACCOUNTING STANDARD BOARD AUDFT COMMTTTEE 
\ CODE OF BEST PRACTICE / \ mTERNALAUDIT / 
\ STOCK EXCHANGE / \ / 
\ EXTERNAL AUDITORS / \ / 
\ COMPANY LAW 乂 \ X 
^^^^^;^^>S_0^^_^乂 
/ ^ A 
/ EVTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS \ 
/ FOR CONFORMANCE \ 
MTERNAL FD^ANCL^L CONTROLS 
W ^ 
Source: A.Banaga, G. Ray, and C. Tomkins, A Conceptual Framework for Corporate Governance 
and Effective Management Corporate Governance Journal, Vol 3, No. 3, July 1995, p. 129. 
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By using the Cadhujy Committee in the UK as an example, we can see how the 
system works. On behalf of the external regulatory system, the Cadhury Committee 
makes recommendations affecting the structure and process of the internal regulatory 
system (eg separation of the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive, appointing of 
non-executive directors, appointment of audit committees) and also the structure and 
process of the internal control system. There is also feedback from internal control 
system. It is expected that the Audit Committee will be in a state of interaction not 
only with the external auditors but also with the reporting mechanisms of the internal 
control system. Similarly, non-executive directors will expect to inform themselves on 
current controls. Again, the internal regulatory system and internal control system are 
linked between as，for instance, by appointing non-executive directors, improvements 
will be gained if they can base their decisions and actions on sound internal control 
systems. 
2.3 Corporate Governance and Legislation 
From the above analysis, it is suggested that the main focus for corporate governance 
is on the structure and process of control. It is, however, here where debate arises 
when the burden of control is put onto the hands oflegislators. While there may be a 
consensus that there necessarily should be some minimum degree of control over the 
securities market, it is not easy for practitioners to come to terms with each other 
concerning the scope and the type of control which should be exerted to them. In 
addition to this, there are always conflicting interests between those of investors and 
directors, and even professional bodies and the government. It is therefore not an 
6 
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easy task for legislators to provide the market with a satisfactory control system and 
environment over which all players participate in. To put the matter into a more 
difficult situation, the peculiarity of a market, as the one in Hong Kong, would make 
some legislation which deemed necessary to impose impossible even at the stage of 
consultation. In the ensuing sections, the existing scope of corporate and market 
control would be briefly described and focus will generally be on the following areas. 
1. Director's duties and obligations 
The main focus is to identify as to whom and for what are director's duties and 
obligations lie. In addition, additional rules be laid down as to ensure the conformance 
of directors to the requirements of the market and the public. This is manifested in 
both companies law and securities law. 
2. Shareholder's rights and Protection 
Again, the main focus is to identify the rights of shareholders for the company, 
and in addition to this, the ways how shareholder's rights can be protected. 
3. Integrity of Market 
The main concern is to ensure a fair play among practitioners exists in the 
market. The area of law and rules in this aspect includes investor protection, 
prevention and penalization of fraud and unfair trading through inside information, and 
the disclosure requirements as relates to transactions of shares and hence change of 
ownership structure, and performance of companies. 
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3.0 Regulatory Framework of Corporate Governance in Hong 
Kong 
3.1 The Regulatory Bodies - A Brief History 
The regulatory bodies in Hong Kong, namely, The Securities and Futures 
Commission and The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, do not have a long history 
though Hong Kong's securities industry has a long history dating back into 1891 with 
the establishment of the Association of Stockbrokers, which subsequently changed its 
name to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) in 1914. 
Until 1974, there were no statutory provisions governing the trading of 
securities, which was carried out in an unregulated market. The stock market crash of 
1973 prompted the government to review the inadequacy of securities legislation and 
to establish a regulatory framework for the securities industry. Two ordinances, the 
Securities Ordinance and the Protection of Investors Ordinance were enacted in 1974. 
The Securities Commission and the Office of the Commissioner for Securities were 
then established to supervise the administration of the Ordinance. 
At that time there were four stock exchanges - the Hong Kong Exchange, the 
Kam Ngan Stock Exchange, the Far East Exchange and the Kowloon Stock Exchange. 
The four exchanges operated with different listing requirements, trading rules and 
procedures. However, it gradually became accepted that if the securities industry in 
Hong Kong was to acquire an international status, there should be a single set of 
rules and regulations. The government decided to unify the four exchanges and in 
1980, the Stock Exchanges Unification Ordinance was enacted which provided for the 
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establishment of a single and unified stock exchange - The Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK). It was until 1986 that the four exchanges were formally unified. 
3.1 • 1 The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong is a self-regulating organisation (public 
company by nature) and is the only exchange company recognised by the Securities 
and Futures Commission to establish, operate, and maintain a stock market in Hong 
Kong. The management and control of the Exchange was vested in a Committee. The 
Committee, formed in 1987, included 21 members, all of whom were individual 
members nominated and elected by other members. Ever since its formation in 1987, 
the Committee has undergone two re-structures which the name ‘Committee，was 
changed to 'Council，and the size of the Council was increased to 31. There are more 
independent members appointed to the Council, however, the majority of them 
continues to be broker members. In addition to this, the Stock Exchange's Articles of 
Association were also changed to remove its ability to declare dividends or issue bond 
issues. 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong has in general 3 major functions: (1) 
promotion of Hong Kong's securities industry, (2) protect investing public, (3) 
maintain securities market as an orderly, fair and efficient one. As such, the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong regulates all members of the Stock Exchange and their 
associates, and all listed companies. By statute, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong is 
directly regulated by the Securities and Futures Commission. 
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3.1.2 The Securities and Futures Commission(SFC) 
The Securities and Futures Commission is established largely as a result of the 
stock market crash in October 1987. After the market crash, a Securities Review 
Committee was appointed to review the constitution, management and operations of 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange, together 
with their respective regulatory bodies - the Securities Commission, the Commodities 
Trading Commission and the Office of the Commission for Securities and 
Commodities Trading. The Securities Review Committee recommended the 
establishment of a single regulatory body. It would be a statutory body formed outside 
the civil service but staffed by full time professionals and would remain accountable to 
Hong Kong Government. It was against this background that the SFC was established 
on 1 May 1989 under the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance. 
The Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance lays down the power and 
function of the Securities and Futures Commission and additional registration 
requirements of dealers and other registered persons. The main role of the Securities 
and Futures Commission is to act as regulator of the Stock Exchange and other market 
bodies. On the power side, it describes the SFC's authority to regulate Exchange 
Companies and clearing houses. The Securities and Futures Commission can restrict 
registered person's business and enter their premises for investigation. With the 
statutory power vested in the SFC, they have power to regulate practitioners in the 
market such as registered dealers, dealer's representatives, investment advisers, 
Exchange companies, clearing houses, fund houses, listed companies, and investment 
public. 
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4.0 Director's Duties and Liabilities 
4.1 Directors duties at Common Law 
At common law, the responsibility for the management of a company's affairs 
is delegated by its articles of association to the board of directors. The general rule is 
that the board's power extend not only to the day-to-day conduct of a company's 
business but also to taking major policy decisions on behalf of the company and 
entering into substantial transactions and contracts, only seeking the approval of the 
company in general meetings before this is specifically required by statute, and by the 
company's memorandum and articles of association. 
The traditional view on directors is that they are (1) trustees of the company's 
money and property, and (2) of the powers entrusted to them. Furthermore, directors 
are acting as agents for the company. Under these principles, therefore, in exercising 
their powers, directors owe fiduciary duties and certain duties of care to the company 
and the members as a body. In addition, many directors are also employees (for 
instance, executive directors) and usually have a service contract setting out their 
duties. 
At common law, the fiduciary duties of directors are briefly summarised below; 
(1) Duty to act bona fide (ie honestly and sincerely) in the company's interests. 
This duty is primarily a subjective duty but with an objective threshold. 
Directors must exercise their discretion and powers honestly and sincerely in 
what they, and not what a court may consider is in their company's interests. 
However, good faith is not sufficient; if an act or decision is one which no 
reasonable director could properly have come to, the court may intervene. 
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(2) Duty to act for proper purposes. 
Directors powers must be exercised for the purposes for which those powers 
were conferred and not for any 'collateral purpose' even if the directors may 
have honestly believed that they were acting in the company's best interests 
(for instance, issuing shares in an attempt to defeat a threatened take-over 
rather than for the prime purpose of raising capital). 
(3) Duty to avoid a conflict of interest and duty not to make secret profits. 
This duty is based on the principle that any profit acquired by a director 
through his or her position as a director must be accounted for to the company 
unless the director has disclosed the profit and his or her retention of that profit 
has been sanctioned either by a majority of the shareholders or (most usually) 
as a result of an appropriate provision in the articles of association. 
(4) Duty not to fetter discretion. 
As a director is bound to exercise his or her functions for the benefit of the 
company, he or she must not, as a rule, fetter his or her discretion. However, 
an outside involvement does not automatically render a director in breach of 
the duty. This is the principle which the encouragement (for instance, the 
Cadbury Code) of involvement of non-executive directors who should bring an 
independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, 
including key appointments, and standard of conduct. Nor does the duty 
prevent a director exercising his or her powers with a view to protecting an 
outsider's interests (for example, where a substantial minority shareholder has a 
right to appoint a director to the board). However, the director must preserve 
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a substantial degree of independence as to how he or she should exercise his or 
her powers whilst seeking to represent and protect the interests of his or her 
‘outsider’. 
Directors can also effective fetter their discretion if they enter into a contract 
on behalf oftheir companies which commits the company to a particular future 
course of action (even if the future commitments turn out to be less beneficial 
to the company) if, at the same time the contract was signed, the directors 
honestly and sincerely believe the contract, including the future commitments, 
to be in the company's best interests. (Fullham Football Club Ltd. v Cahra 
Estateplc. [1992]BCC 863). 
(5) General duty of skill, care and diligence. 
In the earlier years, the court placed a fairly low degree of diligence on 
directors. In Re City Equitable Insurance Co. Ltd {[1925] Ch. 407, atp.408) 
the court held the test of director's duty of skill, care and diligence being the 
"reasonable director exercising a particular individual's skill and experience". 
Continuous attention to company affairs is not required. In Re D' Jan of 
London Ltd. ([1993] BCC 646) the court approved the view that the duty of 
care owed by a director at common law is accurately stated in s214(4) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, ie it is the conduct of ‘ ... [a] reasonably diligent person 
having both (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of the person carried out the same functions as are 
carried out by that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that that director has". Those who undertake 
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a position of trust and responsibility are expected by law to give reasonable 
attention to the duties of that office. 
/ 
The court today now will take a stricter view of company affairs. A director 
cannot assume that his or her duties can be left to others although he or she 
may delegate functions (provided he or she exercises appropriate on-going care 
and diligence in so doing). A director is not the agent ofhis or her co-directors 
and not therefore liable, as such, for co-directors' breach of duty. 
Director's fiduciary duties are owed to the company, ie the shareholders as a 
whole and not to individual shareholders (or to other companies in the same corporate 
group). Shareholders ‘as a whole' includes present and future shareholders and 
therefore the need to balance short term, against long term, considerations and, if there 
are different classes of shares, to act fairly as regards all such classes. It is the 
company therefore which has the right to pursue an action (although an aggrieved 
minority shareholder is permitted to sue an exception to this rule; for example, where 
irregularity by the directors have been condoned by the majority shareholders). 
The director may also have a duty to consider the interests of a company's 
creditors, particularly when the company is insolvent. Once a company is going, or 
has become, insolvent, the courts have, on occasions, recognised that, in reality, a 
company's interests are those of the existing creditors alone. 
Where a company is a subsidiary within a large corporate group, the directors 
must technically still consider only the interests of their company. However, if the 
directors, in considering their company's interests, consider also the interests of the 
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group, that does not mean that they are in breach of duty provided that the directors 
reasonably believed that the transaction was in their company's interests. 
It must be noted that the law makes no distinction between a nominee director 
(per obiter by Lord Denning in Meyer Scottish CWS Ltd. [1958] S.C. (HL)), and a 
non-executive director (Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. v Stebbin2 [1989]. BCLC, 498), 
who, as any other directors, owes the same duties to the company and the members as 
a body. 
4.2 Director's Duties - Listed Company 
In addition to director's duties at common law. and the various provisions at 
statute, directors of listed companies have additional duties under the Listing Rules 
which are encapsulated in two documents - the listing agreement between the company 
and the Stock Exchange and (2) the prescribed form of declaration and undertaking 
which must be signed by each director of the company. 
4.2.1 The Listing Rules 
The Listing Rules have been made by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong under 
s34 of the Stock Exchanges Unification Ordinance, which gives the Stock Exchange 
the power to prescribe requirements for the listing of securities on the Stock 
Exchange. The Listing Rules have been approved by the Securities and Futures 
Commission, as required by s35 of that Ordinance. 
One of the main principles as related to director's duties are expressly stated in 
Chapter 2 of the Listing Rules, in which directors of listed company should act in the 
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interest of the shareholders as a whole, particularly where public shareholders are in 
the minority. This means that directors must avoid conflicts of interests between their 
private interests and the interests of shareholders as a whole. The Listing rules require 
directors to abstain from voting at board meetings on any issue in which they have a 
material interest, and require listed companies to inform, or obtain prior approval from 
independent shareholders for connected transactions. 
Another important area for the compliance of directors of listed companies' 
directors are the continuing obligations imposed by the Listing Rules, which, in 
particular, include the Listing Agreement (the general form of which is set out in an 
Appendix to the Listing Rules), the ‘Notifiable Transactions' provisions (relating to 
specific of a particular size or involving insiders) and the Model Code for dealing in 
securities by directors set out in another Appendix to the Listing Rules. 
4.2.2 The Listing Agreement 
The Listing Agreement covers regularly recurring matters such as notice of closure 
books, requirements for notification of board meetings at which results are to be 
announced in the issuer's annual accounts and in preliminary announcements of results 
and interim reports. It also covers pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders relating 
to the issue of new shares but provides that general mandates may be obtained from 
shareholders for the issue of shares other than on a pro rata basis and for the obtaining 
of a general mandate for the issuer to repurchase its own shares. Other aspects 
covered by the Listing Agreement include notification of changes to the issuer's 
constitution of its officers, publication of information relating to the issue of securities 
16 
under a general mandate, notification of any purchase by the issuer's relationship with 
its shareholders and with the Stock Exchange. 
The Listing Agreement specifically requires the listed issuers to comply with 
the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the Share Repurchase Code and the 
'notifiable transaction' provisions of the Listing Rules. It also requires the issuers to 
adopt rules governing dealings by directors in listed securities of the issuers in terms no 
less exacting than the Model Code contained in an Appendix to the Listing Rules. 
The Listing Agreement contains a general obligations to keep the Stock 
Exchange, members o the issuers and other holders of its listed securities, informed as 
soon as reasonably practicable of any information relating to the issuer or its 
subsidiaries (including information on any major new development in the group's 
sphere of activity which is not public knowledge) that meets the criteria of: 
-which is necessary to enable them and the public to appraise the position of 
the group, 
-which is necessary to avoid the establishment of a false market in its 
securities, and 
-might reasonably be expected materially to affect market activity in, and the 
price of, its securities. 
It is the direct responsibility of the directors here to ensure that such 
information is kept strictly confidential until a formal announcement is made. The 
footnotes to the general obligation in the Listing Agreement state that the overriding 
principle is that information which is expected to be price sensitive should be 
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announced immediately it is the subject of a decision. Failure to follow that principle 
may result in the Stock Exchange imposing a temporary suspension of dealing. 
4.2.3 Notifiable Transaction 
The Listing Rules set out requirements concerning notifiable transactions, 
which are characterised as : 
a) very substantial acquisitions, 
b) major transactions, 
c) disclosable transactions, 
d) share transactions, and 
e) connected transaction 
and detailed provisions establishing which category a transaction will fall into.^ 
The obligations and the compliance of the listed companies and directors with 
notifiable transactions vary depending on the type of transactions. Broadly, any 
disclosable transaction, including a very substantial acquisition and a major transaction, 
will require a press announcement followed by a circular to shareholders, each 
containing specific information. Very substantial acquisitions and major transactions 
must be made conditional upon approval by shareholders either in general meeting or 
by way of written approval of shareholders who hold more than 50% of shares 
carrying an entitlement to attend and vote at the relevant general meeting. 
Shareholders who have a material interest in the transactions cannot give their written 
^Chapter 14 of the Listing Rules. 
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approval and will normally be required by the Stock Exchange not to vote on the 
transaction. 
Trading in the issuer's shares will normally be suspended once the Stock 
Exchange is informed of a very substantial acquisition and an application for lifting of 
the suspension may be treated as an application for a new listing unless certain criteria 
are fulfilled. 
For connected transactions, they are, very broadly, transactions by a listed 
issuer involving a director^ or a substantial shareholder of the issuer. Some connected 
transaction will not be subject to any disclosure requirements and yet others will 
require approval by shareholders in general meeting, with any connected person^ 
interested in the transactions abstaining from voting at the meeting. However, the 
Stock Exchange reserves the right to require that any connected transactions be made 
conditional on approval by shareholders in general meeting. The phrasing of the 
Listing Agreement (Para. 14.94(5)) also gives the Stock Exchange a wide 
interpretation of the provisions and to interpret what falls within ‘ a series of 
transactions'. 
4.2.4 Model Code for Dealing in Securities by Directors 
The purpose of the Code is stated to be to provide guidance to directors on 
occasions where, even though they will not be expressly culpable under the statutory 
^The definition of 'director' has extended to include any person who was a director of the company 
within the preceding 12 months 
^The definition of 'connected person’ is contained in Chapter 1 of the Listing Rules and is extended in 
Para. 14.03. The extended definition includes person co-habiting as spouses of certain connected 
person and children over the age of 18, parents, brothers and sisters and certain in-laws, whose 
association with the connected person is such that，in the opinion of the Stock Exchange, the 
transactions should be subject to the connected transaction provisions. 
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provisions, they should not be free to deal in their company's securities. The principal 
features ofthe Code can be summarised as follows: 
(1) A director should not deal in any of the company's securities at any time when 
in possession of any information which may be price sensitive. Those directors 
not in possession of such information should be cautioned that there may be 
price sensitive information and that they should not deal in the company's 
securities. 
(2) Directors should not purchase the company's securities during the period of 
one month preceding the preliminary announcement of the annual results or the 
publication of the company's interim report, nor should they sell the company's 
securities during that time unless the circumstances are exceptional - for 
example, where a press financial commitment has to be met. 
(3) Directors should not make unauthorised disclosure to any third party o 
confidential information relating to the company. 
(4) As a procedural matter, directors should not deal without giving prior internal 
notification of their intention and receiving a dated written acknowledgement. 
(5) Directors should be deal in securities of other listed issuers at any time when 
they are in possession of relevant unpublished price sensitive information by 
virtue of their position as a director of their own company. 
(6) Director's family interests in company securities and interests held through 
trusts and companies are counted as interests of the directors for the purposes 
of the Code. 
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4.2.5 Further Disclosures Requirements for Director's Interests 
The Listing Rules are continuously changing in accordance with provisions of 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 13 of the said Rules, which confer to the Stock Exchange the 
power to impose additional requirements or waive particular requirements to both the 
Listing Rules and the Listing Agreement, if it sees fit. 
The changes to the Listing Rules which came to force on 1 October 1994, as 
related to director's disclosure of interests, are: 
(1) directors emoluments and compensation of senior management 
(2) directors' and senior management pension schemes and costs. 
Code of Best Practice 
In late 1993 the Stock Exchange, followed the fashion of the Cadbury 
Committee in the UK which recommended the adoption by UK companies of its Code 
ofBest Practice, the purpose of which was designed to increase openness in relation to 
the disclosure of information, amended the Listing Rules to encourage Hong Kong 
listed companies to adopt a Code of Practice set out in Appendix 14 of the Listing 
Rules. These guidelines follow some of the principles recommended by the Cadbury 
Committee and primarily deal with matters as 
• the conduct of a company's board meetings 
• the strengthening of the non-executives' abilities to receive back-up at the 
company's expense, 
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• the holding offoll board meetings to discuss matters involving a conflict of interest 
for a substantial shareholder or a director, 
• the notification to the Stock Exchange of the resignation or removal of an 
independent non-executive director. 
4.3 Director's Undertakings 
Apart from the Listing Agreement, directors of listed companies should 
execute a Form B in respect of each directorship he or she holds on the board off a 
listed issuer to the Stock Exchange. This Declaration and Undertaking of director is 
important for the Stock Exchange's reviewing director's qualifications and provide 
information relevant to the determination of a person's likely suitability to serve as a 
director of a company listed on the Exchange. 
At present, various versions of Form B have been employed at different times 
and they generally fall into 3 different categories, each categorised according to the 
time they are lodged with to the Exchange. Prior to 1989, Form B was not a factor in 
the decision of the Exchange to grant or deny a listing application, unless a director 
refused to provide it. The scope of From B since then was extended and since August 
1993, the Exchange required the Declaration to be made in the form of a statutory 
declaration in accordance with the Oaths and Declaration Ordinance.^ 
The power and the responsibilities in determining the suitability of the proposed 
directors rests with the Listing Committee of the Stock Exchange. If the Listing 
Committee decided that the responses in Form B suggested that the proposed director 
^Introductory Note 4 to the latest version ofForm B. 
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did not have the requisite qualities to conduct the affairs of a listed company honestly 
and properly, the company might have been asked to replace him or her with a 
candidate acceptable to the Exchange. If the Listing Committee considered the person 
suitable, it would then have considered whether or not any information revealed in the 
Form B should be disclosed in the listing document or prospectus. As required by 
Para. 41 of Part A of Appendix 1 of the Listing Rules, these latter document must 
provide information of which shareholders should be aware pertaining to the ability or 
integrity of every director and senior manager or proposed director or senior manager. 
The content of Form B should be read in conjunction with various provisions 
contained in the Listing Rules. Para 3.09 of the Listing Rules provides that every 
director of a listed company must satisfy the Exchange that he or she possesses the 
character, integrity, experience and competence to serve on the board of a listed 
company. In Chapter 8 of the said Rules, it sets forth the qualifications for listing, 
requires that the “persons proposed to hold office as directors of the issuer must meet 
the requirements of Chapter 3 (of the said Rules) to the satisfaction of the Exchange，，?” 
and in Para. 3.09 it provides that ‘every director of a listed issuer must satisfy the 
Exchange that he or she has the character, experience and integrity and is able to 
demonstrate a standard of competence commensurate with his position as a director of 
a listed issuer." The Exchange may request further information regarding the 
background, experience, other business interests or character of any director or 
proposed director of an issuer. 
^ListingRule8.15. 
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In determining the director's character and integrity, the Stock Exchange relies 
on the disclosure in Form B which requires disclosure of matters that relate directly to 
a person's past involvement in breaches of companies and securities regulation, non-
compliance with other forms of non-statutory regulation by professional associations, 
and matters involving fraud or dishonesty. Matters which are outside of these areas 
are not required to be disclosed. In particular, disclosure of a previous offence or of 
other misconduct on Form B does not render a person unsuitable to be a director of a 
listed company. 
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5.0 Minority Shareholder's Rights 
5.1 Majority Rule Principle 
The members of a company can express their wishes at general meetings by 
voting for or against the resolutions proposed. However, the will of the majority of 
the members usually prevails and if the appropriate majority is obtained a resolution 
binds all the members, including those who voted against it. This is the principle of 
majority rule，. 
In addition, subject to a few restrictions, the articles of a company, which 
constitutes a contract binding the company and the members, can be altered by special 
resolution, which is a solution passed by a three quarters majority of the votes of such 
members. 
At common law, the majority rule principle was established in Foss v HarbottIe 
where it was held that the majority have the right to mle the company and the minority 
shareholders could not sue on behalf of the company for a wrong done to the company 
or bring proceedings to rectify an intra company irregularity where the majority could 
lawfully rectify the alleged wrong or alleged internal irregularity. 
5.2 Exceptions to Foss v Harbottle Rule 
While the majority rule principle is firmly established, its counter-balance, 
minority protection, is also firmly held in general law and statute. Under the general 
law, for instance, the doctrine that the majority of the members must not commit fraud 
on the minority but must act bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole {Re 
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Holders Investment Trust Ltd. [1971] WLR 583) is an example of protection of 
minority shareholders. 
The intention of the majority rule probably is to limit vexatious litigation by 
minority shareholders, however, the majority might take advantage of the rule to 
benefit themselves at the expenses of the interest of the minority shareholders. To 
remedy such inequity, exceptions to the majority rules are subsequently developed. A 
minority shareholder may bring an action against the majority if the act complained of: 
(1) is ultra vires or in breach o the company constitution 
(2) amounts to a fraud on the minority or the company, which includes abuse or misuse 
of power by the majority to benefit for themselves 
(3) infringes individual rights - the right to vote, the right to receive notice of general 
meetings, the right conferred by a pre-emption clause and the right conferred to 
individual shareholders etc. 
5.3 Statutory Protection on Minority Shareholders 
On the statute side, the Companies Ordinance is the main piece of laws that 
regulates the ambit of minority shareholders protection. In the main, they can be 
summarised as follows:-
(1) Section 8 - states that if the majority shareholders, by special resolution, alter the 
object clauses of the company, minority shareholders holding not less than 5% in 
aggregate of the company's issued share capital may apply to the court for the 
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alteration to be annulled. If this is the case, the alteration will not have effect 
except in so far as it is confirmed by the court. 
(2) Section 58 - states that the court's approval is required if the company reduces its 
share capital in any way by special resolution. 
(3) Section 64 - states that if a resolution is passed at a meeting of the holders of a 
particular class of shares so that rights attached to shares of that class are varied 
or abrogated, holders off not less than 10% in aggregate of the nominal value of 
issued shares of that class may apply to the court to have the variation cancelled 
(4) Section 142 - states that not less than 100 members or members holding not less 
than 1/lOth of the issued shares of the company may apply to the Financial 
Secretary for him to appoint one or more competent inspectors to investigate the 
affairs of the company and to report thereon. 
(5) Section 143 - states that the Financial Secretary may also investigate the affairs of 
the company if: 
(I) the courts by order declares that its affairs ought to be investigated; or 
(ii)it appears that there are circumstances suggesting that: 
- the business of the company has been or is being conducted for a fraudulent or 
unlawful purpose or in a manner oppressive of any part of its members; or 
- t h e persons concerned with its management have been guilty of fraud, 
misfeasance or other misconduct towards it or its members; or 
- i t s members have not been given all the information with respect to its affairs 
that they might reasonably expect. 
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(6) Section 166 - states that if a compromise or arrangement is proposed between the 
company and its members, a member of the company may apply to the court to 
order a meeting of the members. A compromise or arrangement will not be 
binding on all the members unless: 
(I) a majority in number representing 3/4th in value of the members present and 
voting at the meeting agreed to the same; 
(ii) such compromise or arrangement is sanctioned by the court. 
(7) Section 168 - this section together with the Ninth Schedule details the procedures 
for buying out minority shareholders in the case of a successful take-over of the 
company. Part 1 of the Ninth Schedule provides for compulsory acquisition of 
minority shareholdings only if the transferee has acquired not less than 9/lOth in 
value of the shares for which the offer is made. Part 2 provides that the minority 
shareholders may require the transferee to acquire their shares if he has already 
acquired not less than 9/lOth in value of all the shares in the company. 
(8) Section 168A - states that any member of the company may apply to court if the 
affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of any of the members including himself. The court may make orders 
which include restraining the commission of any prejudicial act or the continuance 
of unfair contract; the alteration of or addition to the memorandum or articles of the 
company; or such other order as it thinks fit for regulating the conduct of the 
company's affairs in future or for the purpose of the shares of any members of the 
company. 
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(9) Section 177(l)(f) - states that a member of the company may apply to the court for 
the company to be wound up if he can satisfy the court that it is just and equitable 
to wind up the company. This remedy has been granted in cases where the 
substratum of the company is gone and where there is a deadlock in the 
management of the company. It is not necessary to prove fraud to succeed on this 
ground. 
5.4 Rights of Members 
Every shareholders of the company has the right to insist on the enforcement of 
the rights attached to his shares, ie the right to vote or to receive a dividend. The right 
to vote gives power to the shareholders enabling them to have a say in matters relating 
to the company. Section 113 empowers members holding not less than 10% of the 
shares to call a meeting. If a member has more than 25% of the voting rights, he may 
block a special resolution (sl l l6(l)) . Matters that must be carried by a special 
resolution include alteration of objects and articles, change of name, reduction of 
capital and winding up of the company etc. 
5.5 Financial Statements 
A member of a registered company has a right to know the affairs of the company. 
The Companies Ordinance requires every company to keep proper books and records 
(sl21(l)) which must gives a true and fair view of the state of the company's affairs 
and explain its transactions (sl21(2)). The director of every company must lay a profit 
and loss account and a balance sheet before the company at its annual general meeting 
(sl21(l)). Every profit and loss account must give a true and fair view of the profit 
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and loss ofthe company for the financial year and every balance sheet must give a true 
and fair view of the state of affairs of the company as at the end of the financial year 
(sl23(l)). The balance sheet and profit and loss account must comply with the 
requirements of Schedule 10 which contains the basic disclosure requirements (form 
and content) of company accounts. 
As an independent check on the company's books and records and accounts 
prepared therefrom, every company is required to appoint an auditor to report to its 
members on the accounts examined by him and on every balance sheet, profit and loss 
account and group accounts laid before the company in general meeting (sl41(l)) The 
auditors are charged with the duty to carry out such investigation as will enable them 
to form an opinion as to whether proper books and records have been kept by the 
company and the profit and loss account and balance sheet are in agreement with the 
books and records. In the auditor's report, the auditors must state, whether in their 
opinion, the company's balance sheet and profit and loss account have been properly 
prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, and whether 
these documents present a true and fair view of the company's affairs at the end of its 
financial year and of the company's profit or loss for its financial year(sl41(3)). 
In addition to the profit and loss account and balance sheet, the Companies 
Ordinance requires that a director's report dealing with the profit and loss and the state 
of affairs of the company must be attached to every balance sheet laid before the 
company in its annual general meeting (sl29D(l)). Certain information must be 
disclosed in the director's report which include the principal activities of the company 
and any significant change in these activities, significant changes in the company's or 
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its subsidiaries' fixed assets, details of shares and debentures issued and the reason for 
the issue, information with respect to any contract for the management and 
administration of the company, and specific information in connection with contracts 
with the company where a director has or had material interests(sl29D). A copy of 
the directors report must be sent to every member of the company together with a 
copy of the accounts and auditor's report. 
For an overseas company which has a place of business in Hong Kong, the 
Ordinance merely requires that copies of its balance sheet, profit and loss account, 
director's and auditor's report be filed with the Registrar of Companies. The form and 
content of these documents are those applicable to the company in its place of 
incorporation. 
5.6 Minority Shareholders Protection in Listed Companies 
The interest of minority shareholders is most vulnerable during takeovers and 
mergers because they have little bargaining power to persons engaged in offers. More 
often than not, the majority's shareholding in a targeted company is bought at a 
premium to the market place but the shareholding and interests of minority 
shareholders are often ignored. This problem is particularly pertinent to Hong Kong 
where most of the listed companies are controlled by a few shareholders or members 
of the same family. 
The main regulation that governs takeovers and mergers is the Codes on 
Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases (“Revised Codes"). 
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5.6.1 Revised Codes on Share Repurchases 
The Repurchase Code was introduced in March 1991 and, after revisions 
resulting from industry-wide discussions and consultations, became effective on 1 April 
1992. It regulates share repurchases by listed companies through general principles 
and specific rules. 
Under s58(l)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, Hong Kong companies have 
traditionally been prohibited from purchasing their own shares (with certain limited 
exceptions). Beginning in 1984, however, companies listed on the then Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, the Jardine Group was the first to began to 'redomicile' overseas, 
and others follow suit. Most of the listed companies 'redomiciled' in Bermuda and the 
Cayman Islands, which already allowed share repurchases. As a result, only some, but 
not all, listed companies could repurchase their own shares, depending on where they 
were incorporated. To eliminate this anomaly, the Stock Exchange and the Securities 
and Futures Commission introduced a temporary rule into the Listing Rules in June 
1989 which banned foreign incorporated corporations with a primary listing in Hong 
Kong from repurchasing their own shares without prior Stock Exchange and the 
Securities and Futures Commission. 
There are many legitimate reasons which share buybacks are allowed and 
inevitable, namely: 
(1) They provide support for a company's share price in times of market volatility by 
enhancing earnings or net asset value per share; 
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(2) They facilitate the raising of control by increasing the percentage of the company 
owned; 
(3) they facilitate the retention of family control of an unlisted company and provide 
shareholders with another potential buyer for their shares; 
(4) They permit a company to re-acquire shares from employees who cease service; 
(5) They allow replacement of equity capital by debt capital, if desired, to maintain an 
optimal capital structure; 
(6) They permit buy-outs of dissenting shareholders; 
(7) They enable a company to return cash, or proceeds of realised assets to 
shareholders, thereby making the company less attractive to potential takeover 
bidders; and 
(8) They simplify administration by allowing repurchases of odd lots. 
In view of the above, the introduction of rules eventually to permit buybacks 
proved inevitable, subject to the compliance of the issues of: 
(1) adequate disclosure of interests in shareholdings^; 
(2) insider dealing^; and 
(3) the source of funds legally available to finance proposed repurchases of shares,) 
^Now under the ambit of the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance. 
^Novv covered by the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance. 
WReferred to in the amended Companies Ordinance. 
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5.6.1.1 Restrictions on Share Repurchases - Listed Companies 
A listed company repurchasing its own shares must do so in accordance with 
the Listing Rules. It must also comply with Repurchase Code Rules to be exempted 
from the general offer obligation as contained in the Revised Code Rule 2. 
Listed companies are required to, as contained in the Revised Code Rule 4, 
obtain approval by ordinary resolution, for which purpose under Listing Rule 
10.06(l)(b) the company must send an explanatory statement (usually a circular) to 
shareholders with information they would reasonably need in order to decide whether 
or not to approve the repurchase, including: 
(1) details of the shares proposed to be purchased and an explanation of the reason 
therefore; 
(2) source of funds - funds must be legally available for the repurchases, by reference 
to the laws of the company'sjurisdiction of incorporation; 
(3) any Takeovers Code consequences of which the directors are aware (eg where the 
buyback would raise a shareholder's holding above the 35 percent trigger level at 
which point he is obliged to make a general offer for all the issued shares of the 
company); 
(4) details of any share repurchases by the company in the previous six months; 
(5) any material adverse impact on working capital or gearing if the proposed 
purchases were fully implemented. 
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The approval may be given either as a ‘one-off approval or an annually 
renewable general mandate to the directors. Any shareholders with a material interest 
in a share repurchase different from the interests of all other shareholders must not 
vote. 
In addition to this, there are also trading restrictions which aim to prevent any 
influence on or manipulation of the market price of a company's shares: 
(1) annual buybacks are limited to a 10% maximum of the company's outstanding 
share capital^. Large buybacks can only be mad under the Code(ie by way of 
general offer or, exceptionally, by off-market purchase); 
(2) a company may not, for 30 days immediately following a buyback, make a new 
share issue without Exchange approval (except for shares issued under warrants 
already issued or share options already granted^^; 
(3) monthly on-market buybacks are limited to a 25% maximum of the trading volume 
in such shares in the immediately proceeding month^^; 
(4) no repurchase is allowed which would result in less than 25% (or the agreed float) 
of the issued share capital being in public hands"; 
(5) a company may not knowingly purchase shares from a connected person and a 
connected person may not knowingly sell his shares to the company^^ but directors 
iiListingRules 10.06(l)(cXi). 
^^Listing Rules 10.06(3). 
i3ListingRules 10.6(2)(a). 
''Listing Rules 10.06(2)(f). 
^^Listing Rules 10.06(2)(c). 
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or controlling shareholders can still apparently, subject to compliance with the 
Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance and the Securities (Insider Dealing) 
Ordinance, deal in a company's securities when that company is also making 
repurchases; and 
(7) when a price-sensitive development has occurred the company may not repurchase 
its shares until the public has been informed of such information. 
There are, however, no price restrictions imposed on repurchases. For companies 
with a secondary listing on the Stock Exchange, the trading restrictions apply to them, 
but the Stock Exchange may waive the requirements, if the Exchange on which the 
company has its primary listing imposes similar restrictions^^. 
The status of the repurchased shares is that they are automatically delisted. 
The laws of the jurisdiction off incorporation will determine whether repurchased 
shares must be cancelled or can be held as treasury stock. Under s49(B) of the 
Companies Ordinance，repurchased shares of Hong Kong companies must be 
cancelled but can be treated as authorised but unissued capital. For companies with a 
secondary listing, the Stock Exchange can waive the requirement to destroy the 
certificates if the company's primary market permits treasury stock" 
Companies may also add repurchased shares to the directors' annual 20% 
general mandate (ie that which allows them to issue further shares without further 
shareholder consent). If shareholders approve such addition at the time they approve 
the 20% mandate and the restrictions in Trading restrictions above are adhered to. 
i6ListingRules 19.42. 
^^Updated Listing Rules 19.42. 
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When a company breaches the Listing Rules or its Listing Agreement, the 
Stock Exchange may suspend the share buyback programmes^^ No member of the 
Stock Exchange may then carry out repurchases until the Stock Exchange lifts the 
suspension. 
5.6.1.2 Notification Requirements 
A company must report all share buybacks to the Stock Exchange for public 
dissemination not later than 9:30am on the following business day. The Stock 
Exchange requires calculation of the 10% annual restriction and 25% monthly 
restriction on a continuous basis. 
It is also a continuing obligation to disclose details (monthly breakdown 
showing price paid) of all repurchases made during the financial year in the Annual 
Report and accounts of the company together with an explanatory statement from the 
directors.i9 
5.6.1.3 Exemptions from the General Offer Requirement 
There are seven types of share repurchases which are exempted under the 
Revised Code Rule: 
(1) an on-market purchase; 
(2) an off-market repurchases, (eg private agreements) approved by at least 3/4th of 
the repurchasing company's disinterested shareholders; 
^^Listing Rules 10.06(6)(a). 
i9ListingRuks 10.06(4). 
37 
(3) an employee share repurchases; 
(4) a repurchase of shares carrying terms and conditions that either permit or require 
repurchases without the prior agreement of the owners of the shares; 
(5) a repurchase requested by a shareholder and in accordance with terms and 
conditions attached to the shares which permit the owner of the shares to request 
such repurchase; 
(6) a repurchase required by a statute of the company's jurisdiction of incorporation; 
and 
(7) a repurchase made in accordance with the Code��and approved or supervised by 
a Hong Kong court.^^ 
5.6.1.4 Offer Period and Other Conditions 
The Revised Code also specifies the offer period and other conditions to share 
repurchases. Under Revised Code Rule 5, the offer period begins on the day the offer 
document and the notice convening the shareholder's meeting to approve the 
repurchase are posted to shareholders, and remains open until such meeting is 
concluded. An approved offer cannot be revised and must remain open at least until 
the close ofFbusiness on the tenth day immediately following the date of the meeting. 
If the offer is conditional on additional conditions (which must be stated in the 
offer announcement), it must specify the latest day when the offeror can declare the 
20Revised Code Rules 4 and 6. 
^'Listing Rules 10.06(4). 
38 
offer unconditional. Where a conditional offer becomes or is declared unconditional it 
should remain open for acceptance for not less than ten days thereafter, but not more 
than 60 days from the posting date of the offer document unless it has previously 
become unconditional.. 
Under Revised Code Rule 13, a general offer cannot be made conditional upon 
the acquisition of a minimum number of shares or on conditions which depend upon 
the subjective judgment or fulfilment by the offeror. 
For general offers for over 10% of outstanding shares off a class, the offer 
document must include an independent financial adviser's reasoned opinion whether 
the proposed repurchase is fair and reasonable and an up-to-date independent valuation 
of the company's property assets, all off which must be filed with the SFC and the 
Stock Exchange and be available for shareholder inspection during the offer period. 
5.6.1.5 Share Repurchases which have Effects Similar to 
Privatisation 
If a proposed repurchase can directly or indirectly compel shareholders (legally or 
economically) to dispose of their interest in any shares of the repurchasing company, 
the Executive should be consulted regarding protection of such shareholders, eg by the 
appointment of an independent board committee to advise on merits of an offer, an 
independent financial adviser to advise such committee, and approval by at least 3/4th 
of such shareholders in general meeting. 
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An example of economic compulsion would be where shares are to be listed 
and the company is not, at the time of the delisting, listed on another exchange with a 
comparable market? 
5.6.1.6 Takeover Code Implications 
Any increase in voting rights resulting from a share repurchase is an 
'acquisition' for Takeover Code purpose. A shareholder, or shareholders acting in 
concert, could thereby obtain control of the offeror and become obliged to make an 
offer in accordance with r26 of the Takeover Code. In the case of a general offer or 
an off-market repurchase, the Takeovers Committee will normally grant a waiver from 
this obligation if the implications of the repurchase are disclosed in the offer document 
and the repurchase is approved by those shareholders who could not become obliged 
to make a consequential mandatory offer ( eg where a shareholder is not acting in 
concert wit the directors, but not where the shareholder purchased shares when he had 
reason to believe that such a share repurchase would take place? 
5.6.2 Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
In Hong Kong there are no statutory rules in relation to any takeovers or mergers. 
The only rules pertinent to this matter are set out in the Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers (the Takeover Code) which was issued by the SFC in consultation with the 
Takeovers and Mergers Panel and its predecessor, the Committee on Takeovers and 
Mergers. 
22Revised Code Rule 7. 
23Revised Code Rule 8. 
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The primary purpose of the Takeovers Code is to afford fair treatment for 
shareholders who are affected by takeover and merger transactions. It seeks to 
achieve fair treatment by requiring equality of treatment of shareholders, mandating 
disclosure of timely and adequate information to enable shareholders to make an 
informed decision as to the merits of an offer and ensuring that there is a fair and 
informed market in the shares of companies affected by takeovers and merger 
transactions. It also provides an orderly framework within which takeovers and 
mergers are to be conducted. The Takeovers Code is not concerned with the financial 
or commercial advantages or disadvantages of any transactions, which are considered 
to be matters for the company in question and its shareholders. 
5.6.2.1 Administration and Sanctioning Power of the Code 
The Takeovers Code is administered by the Executive Director of the 
Corporate Finance Division of the SFC. The Executive undertakes the investigation of 
takeover and merger transactions, monitors related dealings in connection with the 
Takeovers Code and is available for consultation and to give rulings on all matters 
before or during any transaction. 
The Panel (one of the Committees of the SFC), is the body to which the 
Executive may refer any matter for a ruling when he considers that there is a 
particularly novel, important or difficult point at issue. In addition, it is the panel 
which will hear any disciplinary proceedings which the Executive may institute when 
he considers that there has been a breach of the Takeovers Code or of a ruling of the 
Executive or the Panel. The Panel consists of 10 members and 10 alternates. The 10 
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members comprise two representatives of the SFC, one representative of the SEHK, 
four representatives of financial institutions and three representatives of other 
constituencies with an interest in takeovers and mergers, including the Law Society of 
Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Bar Association, The Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants, investment fund managers and listed companies. 
Where disciplinary proceedings are instituted before the Panel and the Panel 
finds that there has been a breach of the Takeovers Code of a ruling, the Panel may 
impose any of the following sanctions:-
(1) a private reprimand; 
(2) the issue of a public statement involving criticism; 
(3) report the offender's conduct to the SFC or another regulatory authority, 
whether in Hong Kong or overseas; 
(4) require registered dealers and advisers for a stated period not to act or continue 
to act (or a stated) capacity for a person who has failed to comply with the 
Takeovers Code or a ruling; 
(5) ban advisers from appearing before the Executive or the Panel for a stated 
period; and/or 
(6) such other action to be taken or not taken, as it thinks fit. 
Disciplinary mlings of the Panel may be reviewed by the Takeovers Appeal 
Committee but solely for the purpose of determining whether any sanction imposed by 
the Panel was unfair or excessive based upon the Panel's finding of facts. The 
Takeovers Appeal Committee is made up of the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of 
the Securities and Futures Appeals Panel and the members and alternates of the Panel 
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(excluding the four representatives of the SFC). However, no member of the Panel 
will take part in the deliberations of the Takeovers Appeal Committee if he participated 
in the disciplinary proceeding under review. 
5.6.2.2 The Principles of the Takeovers Code 
The Takeovers Codes consist of principles and specific rules. As regards the 
general principles, they can be summarised as follows :-
(1) all shareholders are to be treated even-handly; 
(2) if control of a company changes or is acquired, a general offer to all other 
shareholders is normally required; 
(3) during the course of an offer or when an offer is in contemplation, information 
must not be furnished to some shareholders which is not made available to all 
shareholders - this does not apply to the furnishing of information in confidence 
by an offeree company to a bona fide potential offeror or vice versa; 
(4) an offeror should announce an offer only after careful and responsible 
consideration and being satisfied that it will be able to implement the offer in 
full; 
(5) shareholders should be given sufficient information, advice and time to reach 
t 
an informed decision on any ofFer and, therefore, documents and 
advertisements should be prepared with the highest possible degree of care, 
responsibility and accuracy; 
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(6) all persons concerned in any transaction should take every precaution to avoid 
the creation or continuance of a false market; 
(7) rights of control should be exercised in good faith - the oppression of non-
controlling shareholders is always unacceptable; 
(8) directors should have regard to the interests of shareholders as a whole and not 
to their own interests or those derived from personal and family relationships; 
(9) after a bona fide offer has been communicated or the board of an offeree 
company has reason to believed that a bona fide offer might be imminent, no 
action may be taken in relation to the affairs of the offeree company, without 
the approval of shareholders in general meeting, which could effectively result 
in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the shareholders being denied an 
opportunity to make a decision on its merits; and 
(10) all parties concerned are required to co-operate to the fullest extent with the 
Executive, the Panel and the Takeovers Appeal Committee and to provide all 
relevant information. 
5.6.2.3 The Specific Rules ofthe Takeover Codes 
The bulk of the Takeovers Code consist of the rules. A considerable number of 
them are detailed applications of the general principles and are interpreted by the 
Executive and the Panel in accordance with those principles. Examples ofrules ofthat 
nature are the detailed rules requiring the board of an offeree company to retain an 
independent adviser, in certain cases to appoint an independent committee of the board 
and to seek approval of the transactions by a 3/4th majority of the independent 
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shareholders at a general meeting of those shareholders specially convened for that 
purpose and the detailed requirements with regard to the contents of offer documents, 
including profit forecasts and asset valuations which appear in offer documents or 
documents circulated to shareholders of the offeree company. 
Other rules are of a procedural nature and detail steps which must be taken at 
the various stages of any transaction. Thus, they govern the manner, timing and 
consequences of an initial approach to the board off the offeree company, the 
announcement of the results of any offer and the settlement of the cash or other 
consideration under any offer. There are also detailed rules regarding the statements 
which may be made during the course of an offer, restrictions on dealings in securities 
of the offeree by any person who has confidential price-sensitive information before an 
offer is made or by the offeror (and person acting in concert with the offeror) during 
the period of an offer and requirements regarding the disclosure of dealings during the 
offer period. 
The basic timetable which must be followed is that an offer document should 
normally be posted within 21 days (or, in the case of a securities exchange offer, 35 
days) after the announcement of the terms of the offer and the offer must be open for 
at least 21 days following the date of posting. If the offer is conditional, it must 
specify the latest day on which the offeror can declare the offer unconditional and, 
where a conditional offer becomes unconditional, it should remain open for acceptance 
for not less than 14 days thereafter. Except with the consent of the Executive, an offer 
may not be kept open after the expiry of 60 days after the date of posting ofthe initial 
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offer document unless it has previously become unconditional. If the offeror revises its 
terms, all offeree shareholders (whether or not they have already accepted the offer) 
will be entitled to the revised terms and any revised offer must be kept open for at least 
14 days from the date of posting written notification of the revised terms to 
shareholders. Normally an offer cannot be replaced with a revised offer more than 46 
days after the date of posting the initial offer document. Any acceptor of the offer is 
entitled to withdraw his acceptance after 21 days from the first closing date of the offer 
if the ofFer has not by then become unconditional. 
One rule of particular importance is that under which a mandatory ofFer will be 
required except with the consent of the Executive. That requirement arises in a 
number of situations, particularly where 
(I) a person acquires (whether by a series of transactions over a period of time or not) 
35% or more of the voting rights of a company or 
(ii) a person holding not less than 35% but not more than 50% of the voting rights of a 
company acquires additional voting rights which increases his holding of voting 
rights by more than 5% from his lowest percentage holding during the immediately 
preceding 12-month period. That rule would also apply where either of those 
triggers is satisfied by not merely one person but by two or more persons acting in 
concert - ie persons who, pursuant to an agreement or undertaking, actively co-
operate to obtain or consolidate control of a company through the acquisition of 
voting rights. The rules specify a number of classes of persons for this purpose and 
provide that persons within each class are presumed (unless the contrary is 
established ) to be acting in concert with others in the same class. 
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The rules also contain provisions under which a single person (or a group of 
two or more persons acting in concert) who acquires 10% or more of the voting rights 
in a company (or increases that holding beyond any whole higher percentage figure) 
must disclose that acquisition (or increase) and his total holding to the company in 
question not later than 9.00am on the following dealing day,; notification is also 
required in respect of disposals which results in the person in question holding less 
than 10% of the voting rights in the company. 
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6.0 Protection of Investors 
Protection of investors in the securities market entails different areas which 
goes beyond a mere control by legislature. In fact, it covers the whole area under 
which an effective market mechanism is established. As such, there are mainly three 
different areas which are essential to investors protection: 
(1) the protection against loss due to financial defaults by market participants; 
(2) the protection against abuse by financial intermediaries such as brokers, dealers, 
and investment advisers; 
(3) protection against abuse by other shareholders, particularly controlling 
shareholders, and by company directors and management. There is a overlap with 
the areas of minority shareholder protection and director's duties and obligations. 
6.1 Protection against Loss due to Financial Defaults by Market 
Participants 
The main issue in this area is the provision of an effective central clearing and 
settlement system with proper risk management procedures consistently applied. The 
establishment of CCASS, the central clearing and settlement system in 1995 was a 
major development in Hong Kong equity market. For trading activities outside the 
Stock Exchange, there are rules about the capital resources which authorised dealers 
must have, and those rules are controlled and monitored by the Stock Exchange and 
the Securities and Futures Commission. The relevant provisions to this end can be 
found in the Securities Ordinance and the Securities and Futures Commission 
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Ordinance, which it expressly stated the capital resources which registered dealers 
must have, and the setting up of compensation fund in the event ofbroker defaults, and 
a compulsory brokers insurance policy. 
6.2 Protection against Abuse by Financial Intermediaries 
The main protection in this area has four aspects: 
(1) The Licensing procedure for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. 
(2) The conduct of business rules, applied by both the SFC and the Stock Exchange, 
designed to ensure that abusive practices such as front running and rat trading are 
prevented. 
(3) Regular inspections to check compliance with financial resources and business 
conduct rules. 
(4) Disciplinary procedures in the case of rule breaches. 
The main provisions as related to the above areas can be summarised as follows: 
6.2.1 Registration Requirements of Dealers, Investment Advisers and 
Representatives 
Under the Securities Ordinance, only a person registered as a dealer or declared an 
exempt dealer (an authorised dealer) may carry on a business in Hong Kong of dealing 
in securities24. It is an offence for a person to carry on in Hong Kong a business of 
24The term "securities" for the purpose of the Ordinance includes shares, stocks, debentures, loan 
stocks, funds，bonds, or notes of any incorporated or unincorporated body，government or local 
government authority and any other instruments known as securities. 
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dealing in securities or to act as an investment adviser with respect to securities unless 
that person has been registered as a dealer or an investment adviser or is exempted 
from registration. 
The Ordinance also details the qualifications for registration as a dealer. In 
addition, under s23 of the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, the 
requirements for registration was substantially recasted and strengthened. A new “fit 
and proper" criteria were set and the onus is transferred to the applicant who should 
make out a case that they are fit and proper to be registered. 
The Ordinance sets out expressly a number of issues that the Commission will 
take into account in considering whether a person is fit and proper to be registered: 
(1) financial status; 
(2) educational, other qualifications or experience having regard to the nature of 
the functions to be performed; 
(3) ability to perform these functions efficiently, honestly and fairly; and 
(4) reputation, character, financial integrity and reliability. 
In the case of corporations, the SFC will look into the corporation's 
background, financial status, the key personnel, and the organisational structure and 
operating systems and considers whether these areas meet with the “fit and proper" 
criteria. 
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6.2.2 Trading Practices of Registered Dealers 
The Securities Ordinance describes the trading practices which registered 
dealers should reserve. It touches on the areas of ofFers^^ cold calling^^, hawking of 
securities27, options and forward trading^^, disclosure of interests and short selling^^. 
6.2.3 Prevention of Improper Trading Practices 
In Part XII of the Securities Ordinance it provides that it is an offence to create 
or cause to be created, a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any 
securities on the Unified Exchange, or a false market in respect of any securities on the 
Unified Exchange. 
A person shall not with the intention of depressing, raising, or causing 
fluctuations in the market price of any securities, effect any purchase or sale of 
25Section 72 of the Securities Ordinance states that a dealer shall not communicate an offer to acquire 
or dispose of securities of a corporation unless the offer fulfills the requirement as set in that 
particular section. 
26The Securities Ordinance provides that a registered dealer cannot enter into any contract for the sale 
of securities during or as a consequence of a call (which includes a telephone call) by the dealer upon 
any person, whether at his or her home or place of work, unless the registered dealer calls on the 
person at the invitation of that person and, before entering into the contract, provides the person with 
a written statement containing all the information which he would have been required to give to that 
person in compliance with the statutory provisions applicable to the making of an offer to acquire or 
dispose of securities. 
27Under s. 74 of the Securities Ordinance, it is not permitted for a person to call from place to place, 
whether by appointment or otherwise, to induce or to make an agreement with another person to 
purchase securities ot to secure a profit for that person from the yield of specific securities or by 
reference to fluctuations in the value of securities. 
^^ No authorised dealer is allowed to transact in Hong Kong any dealing whereby he confers on any 
person an option to purchase from or sell to the authorised dealer any securities listed on the Stock 
Exchange, or any dealing in securities which is completed later than the end of the next trading day 
after the dealing was entered into. 
29No authorised intermediary is allowed to sell securities or through the Stock Exchange unless, at the 
time he sells them (a) he has or, where he is selling as agent, his ppprincipal has, or 0?) he reasonably 
and honestly believes that he has or, where he is selling as agent, his principal has a right to vest the 
securities in the purchaser. 
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securities which involve no change in the beneficial ownership of the securities. It is 
also an offence for a person to circulate any statement or information to the effect that 
the price of any security will or is likely to rise or fall. 
6.2.4 Duties of Registered Persons 
A registered dealer or person will, under the provisions of the Securities Ordinance, 
have the following duties : 
(1) Issue of Contract Notes 
Section 75 of the Ordinance specifies the obligations of the dealers to issue 
contract notes within the specified time limit. It provides that every dealer 
(including an exempt dealer) shall make out a contract note in respect of every 
contract for the purchase, sales, or exchange of securities not later than end of 
the next trading after the contract was entered into. 
(2) Provision of Information and Statement of Client's Account 
Every dealer is required to provide, upon request, or keep available for 
inspection by the Securities and Futures Commission, a copy of contract notes 
for at least 2 years, and a copy of clients' accounts for at least 6 years. 
(3) Disposition of Securities Document 
Under s81 of the Ordinance, where securities that are not the property of a 
dealer and for which the dealer is accountable are held for safe custody, the 
dealer shall cause the securities to be registered as soon as practicable in the 
name of the person to whom the dealer is accountable; or cause the securities 
to be deposited in safe custody in a designated account with the dealer's 
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bankers or with any other institution which provides facilities for the safe 
custody of documents. 
(4) Segregation of clients Funds in a Trust Account 
s84 of the Ordinance requires a dealer to establish and keep at a licensed bank 
one or more trust accounts into which he shall pay all the amounts which are 
received for/from the sale/purchase of securities, except those amounts paid to 
that person/attributed to the purchases and received/delivered within 4 bank 
trading days. 
6.3 Protection of Investors - Offering of Securities 
The offering of securities in Hong Kong is regulated by three separate 
ordinances: the Companies Ordinance, the Protection of Investors Ordinance, and the 
Securities Ordinance (the main rule of which is the licensing of companies, firms and 
individuals involved in the offering of securities in Hong Kong and sets out rules 
regarding the conduct of any such company, firm or individual). 
The rules regarding the offering of securities are those which arise under the 
Companies Ordinance and the Protection of Investors Ordinance. The two ordinances 
are administered by different bodies,- the Registrar of Companies in the case of the 
Companies Ordinance and the SFC in the case of the Protection of Investors 
Ordinance. The regulatory regimes under the two Ordinances are different in nature 
and structure and apply in different circumstances: the Companies Ordinance applies in 
relation to the offering of shares or debentures, while the Protection of Investors 
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Ordinance applies more generally in relation to the offering of securities (which 
includes shares and debentures, but also covers forms of security which are not subject 
to the Companies Ordinance). 
6.3.1 Offers of Shares and Debentures 
6.3.1.1 The Definition of Prospectus 
The Companies Ordinance is primarily concerned with the establishment, 
management and operation of companies incorporated in Hong Kong and contains 
provisions regarding the distribution of prospectuses of Hong Kong companies. A 
prospectus is defined as meaning "any prospectus, notice, circular, brochure, 
advertisement or other document: 
• offering any shares or debentures of a company to the public for subscription or 
purchase for cash or other consideration; or 
• calculated to invite offers by the public to subscribe for or purchase for cash or 
other consideration any shares or debentures of a company". 
A document can only be a ‘prospectus，where it relates to ‘shares or 
debentures'. The meaning of ‘shares and debentures' is used generally in relation to 
instruments which import an obligation or covenant to pay a sum of money and, thus, 
includes bonds, floating rate notes and loan stock, in addition to instruments which on 
their face are described as debentures. 
The definition of ‘the public', as provided in the Ordinance, is that a section of 
the public can constitute "the public". The Companies Ordinance however contains no 
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specific exemption in relation to offerings to limited number of investors or investors 
of particular categories. This, the question of whether or not a document which is to 
be distributed only on a restricted basis is treated a containing an offer to the public is 
often a difficulty. However, under s49A(2) of the Ordinance it provides that an offer 
or invitation is not to be treated as being made to the public if it can "properly be 
regarded, in all circumstances, as not being becoming available for subscription or 
purchase by persons other than those receiving the offer or invitation, or otherwise as 
being a domestic concern of the persons making and receiving it. 
This section of the Ordinance has been used as the basis for "private placing"-
ie, that, provided certain restrictions are followed, certain types of offering are not 
treated as being offers too "the public". Typically, the restrictions which are followed 
are that offering will made to a limited number of named offerees (preferably limited to 
20 although this figure has increased over the years to as high as 50), the shares or 
debentures in question would not be allotted to persons other than the named offerees 
and any offeree wishing to apply would sign what is commonly referred to as an 
"investment letter". 
6.3.1.2 The Prospectus Requirements 
There are three main consequences of a document constituting a "prospectus". 
(1) The document must be published in the English language and accompanied by a 
Chinese translation. 
(2) The prospectus must contain the information and reports specified in the Third 
Schedule to the Companies Ordinance. 
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(3) The prospectus may not be issued unless there has first been delivered to the 
Registrar of Companies for registration a copy of the prospectus together with 
certain other documents. 
The Registrar of Companies has the power to refuse to register a prospectus if 
it does not comply in all respects with the requirements of the Companies Ordinance 
or, more importantly, contains any information likely to mislead in the form and 
context in which it is included. 
The Third Schedule requires information on a number of different matters, 
including the names, descriptions and addresses of the directors of the company in 
question, particulars of certain provisions of the articles of association of the company, 
etc. The most significant requirements are as follows:-
(1) A requirement for a report by the auditors of the company with regard to the 
profits and losses of the company in respect of each of the five financial years 
preceding the issue of the prospectus, together with an auditor's report 
regarding the assets and liabilities of the company (and of any guarantor) as at 
the last date to which the accounts of the company (or guarantor) were made 
up prior to the date of prospectus. 
(2) Where the proceeds of the issue are to be applied directly or indirectly in the 
purchase of a business, an accountant's report must be included with regard to 
the profits or losses of that business in respect of the previous five financial 
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years and the assets and liabilities of the business at the last date to which the 
accounts of that business were made up. 
(3) A valuation report in respect of the company's interests in land or buildings will 
be required in the case of any company whose accounts at the last date to 
which they were made up disclose that either a value exceeding 10% of the 
value of the assets of the company or a value of not less than HK$ 3,000,000 
was placed on the company's interests in land or buildings. 
(4) In all cases, the prospectus will need to contain sufficient particulars and 
information to enable a responsible person to form a “valid and justifiable 
opinion" of the shares or debentures in question and the financial condition and 
profitability of the relevant company at the time of the issue of the prospectus. 
In addition to this, where the shares or debentures in question are to be listed 
on the Stock Exchange, it will also need to comply with the contents requirements 
under the Listing Rules. 
6.3.1.3 Liabilities of Promoters and Directors 
Under s40 of the Companies Ordinance the promoters and directors of a company will 
be liable to pay compensation to all persons who subscribe for shares or debentures on 
the basis of a prospectus for the loss or damage which they may sustain by reason of 
any untrue statement included in the prospectus. In addition, s40A provides for 
criminal liability in relation to any person who authorises the issue of a prospectus 
which contains any untrue statement. 
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6.3.1.4 Prospectus for Foreign Issuers 
The Companies Ordinance contains also separate provisions regarding the 
issue, circulation and distribution in Hong Kong of prospectuses of companies 
incorporated outside Hong Kong. Those provisions are substantially similar to those 
relating to Hong Kong companies. However, there are differences between the two 
sets of provisions, the more important of which are: 
(1) In the case of a company incorporated outside Hong Kong, the prospectus may 
not be issued, circulated or distributed in Hong Kong unless a copy of it has 
been registered by, rather than merely delivered for registration to, the 
Registrar of Companies. 
(2) There is an additional exemption from the prospectus requirements that does 
not apply in the case of Hong Kong companies. This additional exemption is 
commonly referred to as the "professional" exemption and arises under 
s343(2), which provides that an ofFer of shares or debentures to "any person 
whose ordinary business it is to buy and sell shares or debentures, whether as 
principal or agent" is not treated as being an ofFer to the public. Thus, a 
document containing an offer of shares or debentures by a foreign issuer will 
not constitute a "prospectus “ if that document is circulated in Hong Kong only 
to 'professional'. It is, however, important to ensure that investment letters are 
obtained from the professionals in question and, the investment letter will 
require additional confirmation to support reliance on the "professionals" 
exemption. 
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6.3.2 Offers of Securities 
The Protection of Investors Ordinance applies to offerings of securities 
generally and not merely to offerings of shares or debentures of companies. 
The term "securities" is as defined in the Securities Ordinance and is widely 
cast. It can be summarised as including shares, stocks, debentures, loan stocks, bonds 
and units in unit trusts; it also includes depository receipts in respect of, or warrants to 
subscribe for or purchase, any of those types of securities and any other instruments 
commonly known as securities. An interest in a limited partnership registered under 
the Hong Kong Limited Partnerships Ordinance is also a security for the purpose of 
the definition of"securities". "The expressly excluded "securities" are shares in private 
companies (within the meaning of the Companies Ordinance) , bills of exchange and 
promissory notes (within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance) and 
negotiable certificates of deposit. 
6.3.2.1 General Prohibition 
The Protection of Investors Ordinance adopts a different approach from the 
Companies Ordinance in that it contains a general prohibition, subject to certain 
specific exceptions, on the issue of invitations to the public (and advertisements or 
other documents containing invitations): 
(1) to enter into or to offer to enter into any agreement (a) for or with a view to 
acquiring, disposing of, subscribing for or underwriting securities; or (b) the 
purpose or effect of which is to secure to any party a profit from the yield of 
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securities or by reference to fluctuations in the value of securities or property 
other than securities; or 
(2) to take part in or offer to take part in any investment arrangement in respect of 
property other than securities 
6.3.2.2 Consequence of Breach 
The Ordinance provides protection for investors' trading in securities and other 
property. One of the major terms of the Ordinance provides that any person who, by 
any fraudulent or reckless misrepresentation, includes another person to enter into an 
agreement to secure a profit from the yield of securities or by reference to fluctuation 
in the value of the securities, or induce another person to take part in any other 
investment in respect ofF property other than securities, shall be guilty of an offence. 
The Protection ofInvestors Ordinance also provides a right to compensation to 
any person who has suffered pecuniary loss by reason ofhis reliance on any fraudulent, 
reckless or negligent misrepresentation by which he was induced (I) to enter into an 
agreement to acquire, dispose of, subscribe for or underwrite securities or (ii) to enter 
into an agreement the purpose or effect of which is to secure to any of the parties a 
profit from the yield of securities or by reference to fluctuations in the value of 
securities or property other than securities or (iii) to take part in any investment 
arrangements in respect of property other than securities. 
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he^ . 
The person who is liable to pay that compensation is the person who has made 
the misrepresentation and, where the misrepresentation is made by a company, a 
director ofthat company (including certain persons who are deemed to be directors for 
this purpose) where that person is treated, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
as having caused or authorised the misrepresentation. 
6.4 Protection Against Shareholder's or Director's Abuse of Power 
Protection against abuse of other shareholders and by company's directors and 
management are of particular relevance to corporate governance, and this area of law 
and legislation is especially important as in Hong Kong, the Chinese-mn family 
businesses offer only a minority stake in a public company within a network of family 
firms. Shareholding structure in Hong Kong is therefore much more concentrated than 
in the major Western countries^®. In addition, as nominee shareholders are permitted 
in Hong Kong without disclosure of beneficial ownership, it is difficult to identify the 
real characteristics of the major shareholders. 
In Hong Kong the major development in this aspect includes the enactment of 
(I) Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance，and (ii) Securities (Disclosure of Interests) 
Ordinance. 
3 � n 1988, in 26.3% of fthe quoted companies，the largest shareholder (which could be another 
corporate entity) held more than 50% of the ownership interests, and in 71% of the quoted companies, 
the top three shareholders held more than 50% of the ownership interests. See Dong He, The Stock 
Market and Industrial Finance in Economic Development: The Case ofHong Kong,thesis, University 
offCambridge, August 1993, pp. 154-155. ‘ 
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1^^.. 
6.4.1 Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 
6.4.1.1 The Meaning of Insider Information 
The Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance came into force on 1 September 
1991 and replaced Pt. XIIA of the Securities Ordinance. The operation of the 
Ordinance depends on whether an insider possesses ‘relevant informtion' about a 
corporation and deals in listed securities of that corporation, s8 of the Ordinance 
defines 'relevant information' as meaning specific information about a corporation 
which is not"generally known to those persons who are accustomed or would be likely 
to deal in the listed securities of that corporation but which would, if it were generally 
known to them be likely materially to affect the price of those securities. 
The word ‘specific，seems to exclude market information and market tips. In 
Public Prosecutor v GCK Choudhire^ the court held that the word ‘specific’ was 
synonymous with 'distinct' and ‘precise，and was used in contradiction to 'general'.. 
If the information was to be specific, it and its contents had to be capable of being 
pointed to, precisely identified and unequivocally expressed. In Green v Charterhouse 
Group of Canada’ the court distinguished between two situations: 
(a) Knowledge or expertise developed through experience or financial 
sophistication about the company and its shares from publicly available 
information: this only pointed to the special ability off deduction (from existing 
facts) of the alleged insider which he was entitled to use for his own benefit; 
and 
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(b) knowledge of specific events or probability of future events (eg an intention 
being formulated) gained through the alleged insider's privileged access to the 
company's information which were not available to the public: in such a case, 
the information was clearly insider information. 
The court in Public Prosecutor v GCK Choudhire also dealt with the term 
"information' and said that it had to be knowledge of a particular event orsituation 
such as advice, communication, news or negotiation. Therefore, information must 
have some factual basis. Deduction from existing facts or stories made up entirely by a 
person may not be classifFied as ‘information，. Also, the information will cease to be 
insider information if only a small group of investors are likely to deal in that stock and 
the information has been thoroughly dissiminated and become common knowledge 
among members of this grouppp of investors. 
6.4.1.2The Test ofPrice Sensitivity 
The test of price sensitivity is an objective test and one has to be satisfied as to 
a likelihood of a change in share price of a sufficient degree. Therefore, information 
which is unlikely to inffluence a reasonable investor and would be likely to cause a 
mere fluctuation or a slight change in share price is not 'relevant information'. 
In Hooker v Barim Brothers the court said that the word ‘price ‘ means the 
money or its equivalent for which shares were bought, sold or offered for sale in the 
stock market and did not cover sums paid to a corporation upon allotment of new 
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shares. Therefore, if the information, once publicly known, will not cause material 
change in the traded price of securities of the corporation but will cause the 
corporation to adjust the price at which new shares are issued pursuant to a placing, 
that information will not be qualified as 'relevant information'. 
6.4.1.3 The Definition of an Insider 
For the purpose of the Ordinance，a person is an insider if he falls within one of 
the following categories: 
(a) a person connected with a corporation and in possession of relevant information 
(primary insider); 
(b) a person contemplating or having contemplated making a take-over offer for a 
corporation and knowing that the information is contemplated or is no longer 
contemplated is relevant information; 
(c) a person receving relevant infFormation from a primmary insider or a person in (b) 
above (secondary insider); 
(d) a member or employee of any public body specified in s5 of the Ordinance. 
s4 of the Ordinance defines ‘connected with a corporation' widely to include 
directors(including shadow directors), employees (not confined to senior and high-
ranking-employees) and substantial shareholders of that corporation or a related 
corporation or any person whose pposition or business relationship with the relevant 
information concerning the corporation (eg investment advisers). 
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6.4.1.4 The Meaning of Dealing in Securities 
The definition of dealing in listed securities in s6 of the Ordinance includes 
buying, selling, exchanging or subscribing for securities, agreeing to do any of those 
things, and acquiring or disposing of or agreeing to acquire or dispose of the right to 
buy, sell, exchange or subscribe for securities, s9 of the Ordinance provides that the 
scope of the Ordinance is restricted to securities of the corporation (whether 
incorporated in Hong Kong or not) in question. Therefore, dealings in cover warrants, 
units of investment trusts, or exchange-traded options in respect of underlying 
securities of the corporation are excluded because such warrants, units or options are 
issued by a third party in respect of 'securities' of the corporation but are not 
'securities' of that corporation. 
6.4.1.5 Validity of Insider Dealing 
S14 of the Ordinance states that no transactions (of sale and purchase of 
shares) shall be void or voidable by reason only that it is an insider dealing. This is 
meant to avoid allegations of illegality of contract. However, it does not prevent the 
courts from declaring the transaction unenforceable by refusing to enforce the 
transaction.3i 
3�Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd. v Goodman[1991] BCC 308, The Times, 23 May. 
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6.4.1.6 Liability of Officers 
The definition of officer in s2 of the Ordinance is wide and includes a director, 
manager, secretay and a shadow director. 
Under sl3 of the Ordinance it states that it is the duty of every officer of a 
corporation to take all such action as may from time to time be reasonable in all the 
circumstances for the purposes of ensuring that proper safeguards exist to prevent the 
corporation from perpetrating any act which would cause it to be identified as an 
insider dealer. 
s.l3 is not intended to require the officer to take the relevant measures to 
prevent all insider dealing, including those where the corporation may have one of the 
defefnces outlined in slO. Rather, a company officer has to do what is necessary to 
ensure that either a corporation does not carry out insider dealings or those insider 
dealings are covered by an exemption under slO. The masures may include the 
erection of a Chinese Wall(covered by slO(2)) or taking steps to alert the company's 
treasurer/investment manager to the existence of inside information (through putting 
the relevant stock on the stop list) without disclosing to them the actual contents of the 
insider information. 
6.4.1.7 Consequence of Establishment of Insider Dealing 
The Ordinance provides for the establishment of an insider dealing tribunal. Insider 
dealing itself is not a crime but a crime is committed if compliance is not made with an 
order of the tribunal. The tribunal may make 
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(a) an order that the insider dealer shall not, without the leave of the High Court, 
be a director or a liquidator or a receiver or manager ofF the property of a listed 
company or any other specifFied company or in any way, whether directly or 
indirectly, be concerned or take part in the management of a listed company or 
any other specified company for such period (not exceeding five years) as may 
be specified in the order; 
(b) an order that the insider dealer pay to the government an amount not exceeding 
the amount of any profit gained or loss avoided by tha tperson as a result of the 
insider dealing; and 
(c) an order imposing on the insider dealer a penalty of an amount not exceeding 
three times the amount of any profit gained or loss avoided by any person as a 
result of the insider dealing. 
6.4.2 The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 
Broadly speaking, this ordinance should be read in conjunction with the 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance and prescribes that: 
(1) Persons holding a certain level of shareholdings (currently 10% Of the relevant 
company's share capital) must disclose their "interests" (broadly defined in the 
Ordinance) in voting shares of a listed issuer on a continuing basis. 
(2) Directors and chief executives of a listed issuer must disclose their interests in 
shares and debentures of the listed issuer and certain associated corporations 
on a continuing basis. 
(3) Information on interests or changes in interests of substantial shareholders and 
directors and chief executives is to be published 
(4) Criminal penalties and other sanctions may be invoked in the event of failure to 
perform obligations to disclose. 
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7.0 Conclusion - A Comment on Corporate Governance in Hong Kong 
The regime of corporate governance in Hong Kong has been developed with a 
fast pace and gradually evolved in the past decade. This is especially so if we 
considered that the market philosophy in Hong Kong has been dominated by non-
interventionism and, more importantly, the market has been run largely by Chinese 
type business where there is no separation of ownership from management. 
However, there is still much room to be desired. In a survey of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong which was conducted in 1995, its conclusion was that the 
development of a robust, consistent corporate governance regime in Hong Kong has 
still some way to go practically in the area of composistion and role of the board, the 
codification of governance policies and the role of remunerations and audit 
committees. 
In actual fact, the conclusive remarks of the survey succintly stated the 
defective areas of corporate governance in Hong Kong as viewed from the 
conformance aspect. This is explained in the following sections. 
7.1 The Composition and Role of the Board 
Individual shareholders in Hong Kong are in a weak position as compared to 
majority shareholders and directors, notwithstanding the development of legislature so 
far in this aspect. The main limitation for individual shareholders protection is that, as 
the structure of the majority ofHong Kong's listed companies exhibits the presence of 
one substantial shareholder, generally the family which founded the business, 
68 
ratification of directors' actions has been relatively easy to achieve. In addition, the 
high legal costs of action taken against directors deter shareholders to seek redress in 
court. 
In this respect, there have been suggestions back in 1991 when a codification 
ofdirector's duties was recommended. There have been no change in this area of law, 
however, as there are concerns over the traditional balance of companies business 
activities (and growth) and directors liabilities. And there are technical problems that 
unfairness would be created to directors as, once the action against directors failed, 
directors still has to pay all legal costs for the action. The Standing Committee on 
Company Reform instead suggested to the Administration that there should be some 
kind of voluntary code prepared and published. However, in last year a Stadning 
Committee on Company Reform was called on again and it is expected there will be a 
drastic changes to the Companies Ordinance in the near future. The area of director's 
duties and liabilities would certainly be one of the main concern of the Committee. 
7.2 Codification of Governance Policy 
The main defects of this area is that the Listing Rules(and also its appendix agreement, 
code ofbest practice, and director's undertaking, and also the Takeovers Code), which 
is so crucial in corporate governance in Hong Kong, forms only a contractual 
relationship between the listed companies and the exchange's members with the Stock 
Exchange. There lacks ‘teeth’ in these rules as the sanctioning power of the Stock 
Exchange are limited to reprimand or, more seriously, suspended tradings to stcoks in 
question. 
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Again, there are two sides of the agruments for codification of governance 
policies. The arguments for codification is that, by giving statutory force to the 
governance policies, this would serve as a deterring effect to directors and 
corporations who take insufficient steps towards compliance of rules. The counter 
arguments, as can be found from both legislators and practitioners alike, are that once 
the Listing Rules have been given statutuory force, it will lose the flexibility as 
amendments to the rules would have to follow the same procedures and processes of 
legislation which, with the time required for amendments, this would create a timing 
question to the necessary rules and the loss would largely at the expenses of individual 
investors. 
The breakthrough of this situation is that, lately a draft composite bill of the 
Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance is published for market consultation. In 
particular, the bill states, inter alia, explicitly the Securities and Futures Commission's 
power to investigate compliance with guidelines and codes of conduct, enables the 
SFC to regulate trading facilities outside the monopoly, and retains the statutory 
"30 
monopoly of the stock exchange in Hong Kong. These amendments are in line with 
the enactment of s29A of the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance in July 
1994, which granted the SFC a much wider power in the investigation of company 
records and documents，] Should there be no consequent amendments to the bill, the 
regulatory regime of corporate governance in Hong Kong could be said to have taken 
a closer step in consolidation. 
32See Noel Fung, 'SFC releases draft securities law，，SCM Post, 17th April 1996. 
33See Gerard McMahon, ‘The New Investigation Procedures of the SFC', Company Secretary, Vol. 5, 
No. 1, 1995，pp. 6-9. ‘ 
70 
7.3 The Necessary Back-up Facilities 
Apart from the above, there are gaps between the intention and the outcome of 
the legislation. This is exemplified in the disclosure requirements. First of all, there 
are complaints from practitioners that the Stock Exchange does not provide enough 
information services to the general public on corporation's prospectuses and quarterly 
filings. In addition to this, as disclosure requirements are said to be disclosed to the 
Stock Exchange, there creates a certain anomaly in that while every company which 
seeks a listing is required to file a prospectus with the Company Registry and also with 
the Stock Exchange, many of the subsequent documents subsequently released by 
listed companies do not need to be filed with the Company registry. When 
dissimilation of information services are not well-provided by the Stock Exchange, 
there are in essence no disclosure of public information and the effect of this is 
unfairness to investors who rely heavily on timely disclosure of information before 
making his decisions to invest. Again, such gap is hopefully to be filled up with the 
review of the Companies Ordinance in the near future.^^ 
The corporate governance regime has been ever expanding in Hong Kong and 
is moving in line with international standards. In the near future, there will also be 
reviews on the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance and the Securities (Discolsure of 
Interests) Ordinance, and a review on director's suitability has been undertakened by 
the SFC and the Stock Exchange in June 1995. Apart from the legislative moves, the 
^^There are many other non-accessabilities of information which have yet to be resolved at the 
moment, see 'Failure to Disclose，，Company Secretary, Volume 5, No. 5, 1995, pp. 10-12. 
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Stock Exchange has also launched last year a competition of the best company in 
complying with the continuing listing requirements as a first step towards promoting 
self-regulation spirits amongst listed companies. With all these moves, it remains to be 
seen how far corporate governance will move forward to take the challenge ahead. 
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